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Abstract 
This paper offers a critical assessment of the current state of the debate about the identity 
and individuality of material objects. Its main aim, in particular, is to show that, in a sense to 
be carefully specified, the opposition between the Leibnizian „reductionist‟ tradition based on 
discernibility and the sort of „primitivism‟ that denies that facts of identity and individuality 
must be analysable has become out-dated. In particular, it is argued that – contrary to a 
widespread consensus - „naturalised‟ metaphysics supports both the acceptability of non-
qualitatively grounded (both „contextual‟ and intrinsic) identity and a pluralistic approach to 
individuality and individuation. A case study is offered that focuses on non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics, in the context of which primitivism about identity and individuality, 
rather than being regarded as unscientific, is on the contrary suggested to be preferable to the 
complicated forms of reductionism that have recently been proposed. More generally, 
assuming a plausible form of anti-reductionism about scientific theories and domains, it is 
claimed that science can be regarded as compatible with, or even as suggesting, the existence 
of a series of equally plausible grades of individuality - the kind of individuality that prevails 
in a certain context and at a given level being ascertainable only on the basis of the specific 
scientific theory at hand.  
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Introduction 
The aim of the present paper is to discuss philosophical perspectives on identity and 
individuality for material objects, and argue that − rather than being in an irreducible mutual 
opposition − the originally Scholastic primitivism (i.e., the view that individuality is intrinsic 
and irreducible) and the originally Leibnizian reductionism (i.e., the view that individuality 
reduces to uniqueness of properties) are really the two extremes of a spectrum of positions 
that can (and in fact do) peacefully coexist, as each one of them may be (and in fact is) more 
appropriate than the others in a specific domain of application, and for specific ways of 
describing that domain. In arguing for this view, we devote special attention to non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics, with respect to which we offer reasons for believing, contra a 
widespread opinion, that it describes a domain of primitively individuated objects. More 
generally, we raise doubts about the opinion that some form of reductionism is obviously to 
be preferred from a naturalistic perspective that aims to supply metaphysical claims with a 
solid scientific basis.  
We begin with a brief sketch of primitivism and reductionism, and of the key role played 
by the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles in reductionist contexts (1). In 2, we 
present progressively weaker versions of reductionism. In 3 we critically assess the current 
popularity of Leibnizian reductionism among philosophers of science, concluding that there is 
no real reason for scientifically-informed philosophers to be Leibnizian reductionists. In 4 we 
argue in favour of primitivism in more detail, this time by questioning the philosophical basis 
for the non-Leibnizian sort of reductionism recently defended by Stachel, Ladyman and other 
structuralists. As a specific case-study, in 5 we look at non-relativistic quantum mechanics. 
We suggest that, as a matter of fact, a careful consideration of recent arguments in favour of 
the „weak‟ discernibility of quantum particles lends support to the claim that mere numerical 
difference (countability) is both epistemically and ontologically prior to the putative 
qualitative difference that „neo-Leibnizian‟ strategies insist so much on. In 6, we conclude 
more generally in favour of a pluralistic and gradualistic view of individuality, moving from 
Leibniz‟ absolute discernibility grounded in monadic properties at one end of the spectrum, to 
a view of individuality as based on mere (non-contextual) numerical difference and 
countability at the other end. Such a pluralistic stance, we suggest, requires that we attribute 
to things the form of individuality that can be most straightforwardly extracted from the 
relevant scientific description. This means that: a) In each case in which things are 
individuals, they are primarily individuals in one specific sense directly suggested by science; 
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and b) Given a plausible anti-reductionism about scientific theories and their „levels‟ of 
application, there is no reason for thinking that individuality is given in the same form in all 
cases, as philosophers have instead tended to think. 
 
1. Definitions of individuality, and the received opposition 
To put it roughly, individuality consists in the possession of determinate self-identity and 
numerical distinctness from other things. It has often been argued that this fundamental aspect 
of things can be analysed in terms of some other, more „down-to-earth‟ concept. The most 
prominent among such reductionist views is doubtlessly the view according to which the 
individuality of an entity supervenes on the entity‟s qualities. The idea is that something is an 
individual if and only if its qualitative characteristics are not the same as those of any other 
entity. Clearly, according to this approach, individuality is a derivative concept, and talk of 
individuality could in principle be entirely replaced with talk involving solely the qualitative 
features of things. The alternative to this is, obviously enough, to regard individuality as 
primitive and non-reducible. The ensuing, indeed traditional, dichotomy is thus between: 
 
a) The view that the world is, at root, entirely constituted by qualitative facts (i.e., facts other 
than those concerning identity and number), and individuality is consequently reducible to 
properties;  
b) The view that the individuality of things is something over and above their qualitative 
aspects, so that there can be brute (primitive, ungrounded) metaphysical facts of self-
identity and numerical distinctness. 
 
In the terminology introduced by Adams (1979), the former approach takes the things‟ 
suchnesses as the only components of individuals, while the latter maintains that some form 
of thisness also exists and is the primitive source of individuality. In what follows, we will 
refer to option a) as reductionism and to option b) as primitivism. 
In modern times, reductionism was clearly and forcefully upheld by Leibniz. Leibniz‟s 
reductionist perspective can be summarised as the view that individuality reduces to 
uniqueness of qualities, in such a way that the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles 
(PII from now onward) holds: 
 
x y( P(Px Py)) (x=y)). 
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Literally, the Principle says that if two entities have all the same monadic properties, then they 
are the same individual. This entails that each individual has a set of monadic properties 
unique to it, i.e., that individuality is the same as qualitative uniqueness.
1
 It is clear that an 
assessment of the reductionist view essentially involves an inquiry into the validity and 
epistemic status of PII, which here we will conduct from a metaphysical rather than from a 
merely formal or logical viewpoint.  
 
2. The different readings of PII  
Let us start with the rather well-known fact that if predicates involving identity are 
included in the scope of the relevant universal quantifier, PII turns out to be analytically true.
2
  
It is a widespread (and, it would seem, well-motivated) opinion that, at least within the 
reductionist camp, PII cannot be used as a criterion of individuation if identity and difference 
are regarded as properties and, therefore, presupposed rather than analysed in terms of 
something else.
3
 The question that needs to be addressed when assessing reductionism, 
therefore, is whether a non-trivial version of PII – in which identity is not presupposed in any 
way – can be defended as a valid criterion of individuation. 
In answering this question, it is useful to distinguish between two different ways of 
interpreting PII. On a metaphysical reading, PII is intended to be necessarily true; that is, as a 
matter of metaphysical necessity, no two individuals can have all the same properties in 
common. On an epistemic reading, instead, the view is that − as far as we know − there are 
good reasons for believing that numerically distinct but indiscernible individuals do not 
actually exist. Importantly, the metaphysical reading is based on the idea that the necessary 
truth of PII can be established on non-empirical grounds, and that this fact has consequences 
for our knowledge of, and claims about, things in the world; the epistemic reading reverses 
the order of argumentation, and claims that it is experience that gives us reasons for using PII 
as a criterion for ascribing individuality to things. 
Rather than discussing the various arguments for or against the metaphysical reading 
(which, in any case, all appear far from conclusive to us), here we will simply take for granted 
                                                 
1
 There is, of course, also an important connection with the work of Quine. On the basis of ideas of Hilbert and 
Bernays, Quine showed that (provided that the vocabulary of non-analysed general terms is finite) the identity 
sign can be paraphrased away in any first-order language, and replaced with a conjunction of non-identity-
involving formulas (in particular, conditionals of the form „if Fx then Fy‟ for any x and y and any number of 
places in F). This must be mentioned, as authors that we will discuss later on worked in an explicitly Quinean 
setting. 
2
 For PII as an analytical truth, see Whitehead and Russell (1925, 57), Church (1956, 302) and Brody (1980, 6-
9). 
3
 For a defence of this claim, see Black (1952, 155), Ayer (1954, 29), Katz (1983), and Rodriguez-Pereyra 
(2006). 
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that PII is not a necessary truth, and that it is its epistemic reading that deserves discussion − 
where “epistemic”, crucially, presupposes a confrontation with our best scientific knowledge. 
We will consequently assess PII, and reductionism more in general, from a „naturalistic‟ 
standpoint, one according to which our metaphysical claims should be supported by, and be 
compatible with, our best current scientific knowledge of the world. 
 However, before moving on, and as a first step towards the view that individuality „comes 
in degrees‟, let us begin by reminding the reader that Leibniz committed himself to a strong 
version of PII (henceforth, PIIa), one that excludes spatial location from the scope of the 
universal quantifier ranging over properties appearing in the principle, and only takes into 
account monadic intrinsic properties. Once Leibniz‟s peculiar theologico-metaphysical 
reasons for wanting such a restriction are dropped, however, a weaker form of PII, 
quantifying also over spatial locations (PIIb), presents itself as far more plausible. The most 
important consequence of the move from PIIa to PIIb is that the latter allows for otherwise 
qualitatively identical things to be made numerically distinct by the mere fact that they exist at 
different places. This weaker version of PII, that is, can be used to express the age-old idea of 
using space as a principium individuationis − an idea defended, among others, by Aquinas, 
Kant and Schopenhauer.
4
 Obviously enough, any two objects that are distinct individuals 
according to PIIa are also distinct according to PIIb, but not conversely. Consequently, the 
„grade of individuality‟ that PIIb ascribes to entities is proportionally weaker than that 
„captured‟ by PIIa. 
But is such a weaker formulation of PII compelling? The locus classicus with respect to a 
critical assessment of PIIb is Black‟s (1952) completely symmetric universe, only inhabited 
by two numerically distinct spheres having all the same monadic properties. In particular, it 
looks as though the spheres‟ spatial positions must be defined in relational terms, because − 
by hypothesis − only the two spheres exist “and nothing else” (1952, 156).5 It would seem that 
Black‟s thought experiment shows that there is at least one conceivable circumstance in which 
we cannot make recourse even to space as principium individuationis and, therefore, PIIb is 
violated: that one sphere is distinct from the other sphere seems to be a primitive fact, neither 
grounded in an intrinsic qualitative difference nor in a difference with respect to location in 
space. Ignoring the long-standing debate about the actual strength of Black‟s argument6, here 
                                                 
4
 And by no means limited to historical figures in philosophy: for the influence of Schopenhauer‟s view of space 
on Einstein‟s thoughts on separability, for instance, see Howard (1997). 
5
 It could be objected that Black doesn‟t explicitly rule out the existence of a spatial background. This, however, 
doesn‟t affect the strength of the counterexample, as the location occupied by each sphere must in any case be 
described in absolutely general terms, turning out to be the same for the two spheres. 
6
 Black‟s argument might be rejected as question-begging (as in, for example, Odegard (1964)) or as re-
describable in reductionist terms (as in Hacking (1975)). But the former objection has no force here, as we are 
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we will instead notice that when presented with Black‟s universe, one has the feeling that 
something has been tacitly „smuggled in‟ in an illegitimate way. This something, in particular, 
has to do with the status of the spatial relation holding among the identical spheres, which 
indeed seems to constitute a qualitative difference. Does this mean that the formulations of PII 
considered so far do not capture all possible qualitative facts about things, that is, all possible 
forms of individuality as discernibility?  
Following certain Quinean reflections, a positive answer to this question has been recently 
given (Saunders (2006)). Quine (1976) explained that what he calls strong and moderate 
discriminability are in fact not the only possibilities. It is also possible, says Quine (ibid.; 
114), that two objects are weakly discriminable, a fact that occurs when they satisfy a formula 
containing a predicate satisfiable by two entities in any order, but not by one of them alone, 
such as, for instance, “…goes in the opposite direction to...”. Black‟s spheres, says Saunders, 
clearly turn out to be weakly discernible (here, we will not follow Quine‟s idiosyncratic 
terminology), as there exists a weakly discerning relation holding between them: in particular, 
an irreflexive spatial relation determining that each one of the spheres is at some distance 
from the other (but not from itself) and, consequently, that there are two numerically distinct 
but qualitatively identical spheres.  
The foregoing indicates that it is in fact possible to formulate a version of PII that sets even 
weaker requirements on individuality than both PIIa and PIIb, thus individuating certain 
entities that both these forms of PII fail to individuate. Informally, what we will from now on 
refer to as PIIc says that if any two entities have all the same monadic properties and partake 
in no irreflexive relation, then they are one and the same individual; hence, that the 
participation in an irreflexive relation is sufficient for individuality.  
However, PIIc appears to be much more controversial than the other two versions of PII. 
This is due to the fact that, while PIIc is an unquestionable logical principle – recall that, as 
Quine showed, the identity relation is in fact coextensive with the conjunction of all the 
relevant non-identity-involving formulas whenever there is a finite number of unanalysed 
general terms – this does not ipso facto ground it as an indisputable metaphysical claim. For, 
there is no obvious correspondence between the predicates appearing in a language that we 
might decide to use for describing the world and the properties and relations that are actually 
exemplified in the world itself. And this is particularly true when it comes to relations, as 
                                                                                                                                                        
looking for a justification of PII in the first place. With respect to the latter, it must be noticed instead that a re-
description may not always be available, and Hacking‟s strategy might in any case not be regarded as a 
legitimate reductionist response. An „extreme‟ option is to follow O‟Leary-Hawthorne (1995) in claiming that in 
Black‟s universe one has only one sphere at some distance from itself, but this really looks like a last resort for 
the defender of PII, especially from a „naturalistic‟ viewpoint. 
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these have a much more problematic metaphysical connotation than „canonical‟ properties. 
Incidentally, it is crucial here to appreciate this logic/metaphysics divide because, while 
acknowledging that PII can be given independent logical motivations, here we are interested 
in its role within a naturalistic metaphysics of the sort we are after. Consequently, we feel 
authorised to bracket the discussion of the logical status of PIIc, and focus instead on the 
ontological presuppositions it rests upon, and on its ontological consequences. 
In this context, however, an immediate problem with the proposal of using weak 
discernibility to neutralise anti-reductionist counterexamples of the sort devised by Black is 
that it smells of circularity. In particular, it could be objected that no relation can be said to 
hold unless we have two relata to begin with, so that numerical distinctness must be 
presupposed. To this charge of circularity (irreflexive relations can discern only if we already 
have two individuals) it might be replied that relations need not always be derivative, i.e., 
dependent on the prior existence of their relata, and could at least in some cases ground, or be 
prior to, the numerical distinctness of things. This is, of course, a contentious and possibly ad 
hoc move, as we don‟t seem to have independent evidence to assume the existence of such 
relations.  
Be that it is may, in order to give our opponent all the ground she needs, we won‟t exclude 
that this counterintuitive view of relations can be consistently upheld so as to avoid the 
circularity objection. For us, it will in fact be sufficient to show that since the reasons that are 
normally adduced for preferring reductionism to primitivism will not turn out to be 
compelling, the controversial status of relations existing prior to relata will give us an 
additional reason for doubting the force of weak discernibility as a weapon for the 
reductionist. Indeed, we will argue that at least in some cases primitivism should in fact be 
preferred to reductionism, if only on mere grounds of simplicity and minimisation of 
metaphysical revision. 
In more detail, in the sections to follow we will first of all argue that, contrary to what 
seems to be a widespread consensus, a proper naturalisation of metaphysics doesn‟t by any 
means entail that we should opt for a reductionist conception of individuality. The same 
holds, we will also argue, for a relatively new, non-Leibnizian, form of reductionism – 
endorsed by various structuralists − according to which identity is always contextually, albeit 
not necessarily qualitatively, determined. After that, we will look specifically at non-
relativistic quantum mechanics and suggest that it is best interpreted as a theory of primitively 
individuated entities. At the same time, on the basis of a plausible form of anti-reductionism 
about scientific theories and their levels of application, we will argue that naturalists should 
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nevertheless allow for a plurality of forms of individuality, i.e., for the possibility that entities 
in one scientific domain are individuated in a way different from entities in another scientific 
domain. What is fundamental, we will claim, is to look at the best available scientific 
description of the entities we are dealing with in a given context, and see which form of 
individuality can be most straightforwardly „extracted‟ from that description in that context. 
 
3. The alleged scientific basis of Leibnizian reductionism 
As witnessed by the recent flourishing literature on identity and discernibility in the special 
sciences (physics in particular), scientifically-minded philosophers who aim to answer 
metaphysical questions are in the vast majority of cases sympathetic to reductionism about 
individuality. A tacit assumption underpinning such endorsement of reductionism by 
naturalistically inclined philosophers is, no doubt, one according to which reductionism 
allows one to account for the individuality of things without invoking any mysterious 
metaphysical factors going beyond what science tells us. In particular, the main motivation for 
insisting on a reductionist view of individuality seems to be the desire to avoid all 
metaphysical assumptions that are not empirically supported by well-corroborated science or, 
worse, that cannot in principle „make a difference‟ at the observable level (where 
“observability” here is being understood in the broadest possible manner): haecceitates, bare 
particulars, etc. 
In the quantum case, for example, it is exactly the endorsement of a form of naturalism that 
led many to regard the question whether particles are discernible as fundamental. For, that 
quantum particles may be regarded as individuals by attributing some form of „transcendental 
individuality‟ to them is well-known at least since Post (1963) and French and Redhead 
(1988). But naturalists, while clearly interested in trying to preserve the idea that quantum 
mechanics describes a domain of individual objects (peculiar in some respects though these 
may be), have typically rejected this solution as evidently relying on non-scientifically-
respectable metaphysical posits. 
Since the specific case of quantum mechanics will be discussed in more detail later, here 
we will focus on the more general inference from naturalism to reductionism. We believe that 
three important points must be made with respect to such inference. 
1) As we see the issue, first of all, in most of the current literature on the topic there is an 
as simple as much as misleading implicit conflation between two different ways of 
determining what is supported by, or to be deemed meaningful on the basis of, science and 
what is not. The first equates what is acceptable with what is qualitative – roughly, with 
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properties like colour, mass, charge and the likes, that do not „encode‟ any „information‟ 
about the identity of any specific individual. The second defines what is naturalistically 
acceptable as whatever contributes to a complete description of things according to our best 
current science. While the former stance is obviously much closer to the Leibnizian spirit, it 
seems to us that it sacrifices (or, at any rate, may sacrifice) a lot of what qualifies as part and 
parcel of scientific theorising in a way that, in fact, the naturalistically-inclined philosopher 
should not accept. Hence, one should rather opt for the latter understanding of „scientifically 
acceptable‟.  
1) For one, notice that indiscernible objects can make an empirical difference in spite of 
their being indiscernible, and merely in virtue of the fact that they are numerically distinct. 
This implies that the qualitative uniqueness of material objects is not necessary for the 
empirical significance and the scientific meaningfulness of claims concerning physical 
systems containing those objects. For instance, a world with two exactly similar material 
objects exhibits twice the mass of a world with only one of them; and the same holds for 
typical quantum-mechanical systems, where it is possible that two of them only differ with 
respect to how many particles (i.e., how many instances of certain properties) they contain 
(see Hawley (2009)). This only holds as long as properties are additive, of course, but it is 
clear that many of the relevant physical properties of material objects are indeed additive. 
This too often overlooked fact should already give some pause to the scientifically-minded 
metaphysician who aims to accept only „empirically grounded‟ metaphysical posits: there are 
in fact no obvious reasons for ruling out indiscernible objects as a matter of principle solely 
on the basis of empirical indistinguishability plus Ockham‟s razor!  
2) Secondly, the possibility that facts of numerical distinctness might be as fundamental as, 
or even more fundamental than, facts about qualities seems to be directly suggested by some 
scientific theories. We will argue in more detail later that the use of the term “more 
fundamental” is justified in non-relativistic quantum mechanics, where all formulations of 
physical problems consider the number of particles as a fundamental assumption, one which 
enters into the construction of the right kind of model for the physical problem at hand (that 
is, a Hilbert space or a configuration space with the correct number of dimensions), 
independently of considerations related to the qualitative features of things. In other words, 
we will see that the presence of particle names or „labels‟ in the quantum formalism, rather 
than regarded as an accidental feature of quantum theory, can instead be legitimately given a 
direct physical significance (notice, incidentally, that we do not need to restrict this claim to 
anti-symmetric quantum states, but can extend it also to bosons). 
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3) Our third point is that primitive intrinsic identities need not be taken to constitute 
„mysterious metaphysical additions‟ to the qualities of things, and may simply coincide with 
fundamental, ungrounded facts about the existence of certain entities. In other words, there is 
no reason for thinking that primitive intrinsic individualities can only exist if they are based 
on full-blown „properties‟ additional to the other properties of things. Historically, this was 
clearly stated already within the Scholastic tradition, that many naturalistic metaphysicians 
are (too) quick to dismiss: while Duns Scotus did in fact regard haecceitates as full-blown 
components of things, Ockham – in keeping with his general nominalistic attitude – insisted 
that individuality just corresponds to a fundamental „way of being‟ of objects, i.e., to facts 
about those objects that neither allow for nor demand further analysis. It seems to us that the 
Ockhamian perspective is both internally consistent and perfectly compatible with a 
naturalistic methodology. To the reductionist who remains sceptical about this and wonders 
whether it is anything more than a „terminological trick‟ we respond as follows: if the 
naturalist is never allowed to introduce something that is primitively what it is, how can the 
reductionist fully and satisfactorily develop his/her own theory? Properties too, be they 
universals or particularised instances, have well-defined identity conditions, in virtue of which 
they are the specific entities they are; and these conditions are either analysable, but then the 
threat of an infinite regress immediately arises, or else are primitive. The same seems to hold 
for any ontological construction. 
 
4. Non-Leibnizian reductionism? 
Indeed, self-proclaimed naturalists have already acknowledged the existence of valid 
counterexamples even to PIIc. In referring to the PII in the field of mathematics, for instance, 
Ladyman (2007) considers two-node graphs with no edges (mathematical systems composed 
of two absolutely indiscernible objects) and concludes that, for cases like these, there is no 
reason to expect that some Leibnizian principle will turn out to apply. 
By distinguishing sharply between mathematical and physical ontology, one could argue 
that this sort of considerations are simply irrelevant for the case at hand, since we are only 
interested in the ontological nature of material, concrete objects. Apart from the fact that one 
could reject the existence of a sharp divide between mathematical and physical ontology, 
however, this conclusion would be hasty. For, it is certainly possible to refer to the abstract 
domain inquired into by mathematics as a model for how to conceive of the physical world, 
especially if there is evidence for the claim that there are clear analogies between what can be 
said about certain mathematical objects on the one hand, and physical objects as they are 
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represented by mathematical models on the other. In this sense, we agree with Ladyman that 
reflections about mathematical ontology have at least heuristic value in the present context.
7
 
Indeed, Ladyman compares the abovementioned graphs with quantum statistics, where 
identical particles in the same state are notoriously permutation-invariant, and with space-time 
points in General Relativity (GR). In particular, if in GR the metric field is defined on the 
manifold functions as a globally defined individuating entity for the manifold points (Stachel 
(1993), Dorato and Pauri (2006)), then diffeomorphically-related models can be regarded as 
physically identical, as it should be in order to avoid undesirable violations of determinism 
implied by the hole argument (Earman and Norton (1987)). Several authors, and Ladyman 
among these, take this to mean that the points of the manifold are not discernible in any way, 
and are only contextually individuated by the relations that characterise the metric field as it is 
defined on the manifold. This example should suffice to accept the claim that examples 
coming from pure mathematics may provide evidence to the fact that the nature or “grade” of 
individuality of certain mathematical objects can be the same as that of certain physical 
entities, provided that we have independent reasons to suppose that their formal counterparts 
in the mathematical model do genuinely refer. This claim entails a structural analogy between 
the ontological status of certain mathematical objects and certain physical objects. 
 If this general approach to the relationship between the mathematical and the physical 
domains is accepted (and we don‟t see why it shouldn‟t, given the patent structural analogies 
between the mathematical and the physical), there is only one move available to the 
reductionist in view of the potential counterexamples to PII. That is, to give up one of the 
central tenets of his/her position − the qualitative analysability of individuality − but stick to 
the other key element of reductionism, namely the idea that identity and individuality are 
contextually determined. 
Indeed, Ladyman explicitly claims that, in those cases in which the identity and 
individuality of an object cannot be grounded in qualitative differences, they must anyway be 
regarded as determined by the whole system to which the object in question belongs. In other 
words, one should postulate some sort of non-qualitative „identity- and difference-making 
relations‟ that characterise the total system/structure. 
This leads straightforwardly to a „non-Leibnizian’ form of reductionism, corresponding to 
what Stachel and Ladyman call „contextualism‟. Contextualism is, in particular, a form of 
reductionism because it invites one to analyse the individuality of objects in terms of 
                                                 
7
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing us the point concerning mathematical as opposed to 
physical ontology. 
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something else, external to the objects themselves; but it is also non-Leibnizian because this 
something else is not (at least not necessarily) something qualitative. 
But why choose contextualism rather than primitivism? Recall that, while fully in 
agreement with the reasoning that led Ladyman to embrace contextualism, in the previous 
section we also questioned the traditional arguments against primitivism, according to which 
primitive identities are unacceptable, non-scientifically-grounded, metaphysical posits. 
The contextualist inference from the examples coming from graph theory and GR to the 
claim that, necessarily, identity is determined contextually rests on one fundamental 
argument, which goes as follows. Primitive intrinsic individuality entails haecceitism, i.e., 
differences between what distinct worlds say de re about certain individuals that do not 
correspond to overall qualitative differences among those worlds. But haecceitism is directly 
contradicted by contemporary science. In particular, the sort of permutation invariance that, as 
we have just seen, is pervasive across different scientific domains points to anti-haecceitism, 
as there are no two possible worlds described by the relevant theory that differ merely with 
respect to the identities of the things they contain. Hence, the naturalist metaphysician must in 
any case be a reductionist about individuality. 
Is this a compelling argument for endorsing reductionism at least in its non-Leibnizian 
version? We think the answer to this question is negative, for at least two reasons. 
First, primitive intrinsic individuality need not entail haecceitistic differences. What is true 
of distinct worlds is not univocally determined by the nature of the identity of each individual 
object among those inhabiting them, and intra-world and trans-world considerations in fact 
have an important degree of mutual independence. Indeed, metaphysical frameworks are 
available in which objects possess primitive intrinsic identities but this fact does not entail 
haecceitism.
8
 A counterpart-theoretic treatment of possible worlds, for example, allows for 
primitive intra-world identities (i.e., primitive intrinsic individuality for objects) together with 
anti-haecceitism about modality. And it is interesting to notice that this is directly relevant 
with respect to the physical evidence Ladyman refers to. For instance, with reference to GR, 
Butterfield (1989) argued that, if points of the manifold have primitive intrinsic identities but 
these are not preserved if one exchanges them while preserving their overall relationships 
(which is what happens on the counterpart-theoretic account of trans-world identity), 
substantivalism is kept safe from the alleged dire consequences of the hole argument.  
One may object that, if counterpart theory and other suspicious „metaphysical tricks‟ are 
set aside, that entities (may) possess primitive identities immediately leads one to 
                                                 
8
 In other words, haecceitism and the view that individuals (may) possess haecceities are distinct and largely 
independent theses. 
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acknowledge the possibility of haecceitistic differences. Here, however, comes our second 
point: when one has to account for specific non-haecceitistic facts which apparently contradict 
the claim that things possess primitive intrinsic identities, there might be viable, non-ad-hoc 
explanations of the evidence that tell us why haecceitistic differences are not manifest - not 
empirically meaningful - without at the same time involving a more general choice between 
haecceitism and anti-haecceitism. Consider for example quantum statistics, in which 
exchanging indistinguishable particles does not give rise to new, statistically relevant states. 
In this case, contrary to contextualism as well as to the „Received View‟ (according to which 
the evidence points to the non-individuality of particles), it is possible to claim that (i) 
particles possess primitive intrinsic identities but (ii) their state-dependent properties are 
holistic properties that only belong to the whole, in such a way that they exclusively describe 
correlations between parts of it (for more details, see Morganti (2009)).
9
 This immediately 
explains the peculiar features of the quantum domain while leaving it open whether, had their 
state-dependent properties been monadic, quantum particles would have given rise to 
haecceitistic differences. It can of course be questioned which explanation is the most 
plausible and least costly, but the mere existence of an alternative possibility suffices to show 
that the claimed implication between intrinsic primitive identity and „empirically relevant‟ 
haecceitism doesn‟t hold.  
Another important thing to notice is how relevant a consideration of contextualism is with 
respect to our earlier discussion of naturalism and putatively mysterious metaphysical posits. 
We have already argued that primitivists can agree wholeheartedly with reductionists that 
mysterious, real yet non-physical, entities should be avoided when providing a metaphysical 
account of reality. Here, we have just seen that contextualists present their thoroughly non-
Leibnizian position as motivated by science, hence as eminently satisfactory from a 
naturalistic viewpoint. Logically, this can only mean that contextualists regard contextual, 
non-qualitatively analysable facts of numerical identity and distinctness as not corresponding 
to mysterious metaphysical posits; thus, that they see naturalism as independent of Leibnizian 
reductionism. But then it follows that, exactly in the same way as the relations of numerical 
difference emphasised by contextualists, primitive intrinsic identities need not be taken to 
constitute „metaphysical additions‟ to the qualities of things, and may simply coincide with 
fundamental, ungrounded facts about the existence of certain entities (one may even go so far 
as to saying that primitive intrinsic individuality is nothing but a limiting case of ungrounded 
                                                 
9
 Following this line, it might even be suggested very generally that a modification of our entrenched beliefs 
about other aspects of reality (e.g., the properties of composite systems) should always be preferred over one 
involving the identity and individuality of objects). 
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contextual individuality within a system composed of only one entity). In other words, if 
Ladyman/Stachel-style contextualism is a live option in the physical world in any context in 
which the grade of individuality is, so to put it, „very low‟ because not qualitatively grounded, 
in the very same situations intrinsic, primitive individuality is also admissible, at least in what 
we called its „Ockhamian‟ form in the previous section.  
From these considerations and the ensuing metaphysical underdetermination, we infer that 
the necessity of contextualism has not been argued for convincingly, while primitivism gains 
further credibility. The analysis just carried out, however, does not simply point to the fact 
that the metaphysics of identity and individuation is to be regarded as underdetermined by the 
evidence.  
In the next section, we will consider one specific example, widely discussed in the recent 
literature, and provide reasons for regarding the entities in the relevant domain as primitively 
individuated. We will argue that the considerations brought to bear in the course of the case 
study − having to do with the formal features of the relevant theory and the way in which 
these are most straightforwardly interpreted in metaphysical terms − lend support to 
primitivism in that context. This, however, does not mean that one should generalize to other 
domains the specific conclusions about identity and individuality arrived at in the case study, 
since in other domains reductionism is (or, at least, may be) a better option. Our take-home 
lesson will be, in conclusion, that in most (if not all) cases it is reasonable to think that science 
can be supplied with a well-defined and compelling (albeit different for different cases) 
metaphysical interpretation; but a form of pluralism about identity and individuality is 
advisable, one which includes primitivism as an acceptable metaphysical stance also for 
naturalists.  
Before continuing, however, one remaining question has to be addressed in this section. 
Could the naturalist introduce forms of PII that are able to capture non-qualitative, but 
scientifically grounded, facts of numerical identity and distinctness as those discussed above? 
This would mean to add what we might label PIId and PIIe to the various versions of PII 
already presented, the former capturing the relations of numerical difference grounding 
contextual non-qualitative individuality, the latter the intrinsic facts of numerical uniqueness 
grounding intrinsic, non-qualitative individuality. We think that this attempt to extend the 
Leibnizian tradition (hence, reductionism) so as to allow for individuality facts only grounded 
in countability is not necessarily doomed to failure: for, the relevant properties are, as we 
argued, part of the scientific description of the domain in question, and it would be at least 
possible to interpret „modern-day‟ reductionism about individuality as the view that whatever 
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appears in the relevant scientific description should be quantified over in PII, and 
individuality be reconstructed accordingly.
10
 However, we also believe that this perspective is 
in tension with the spirit of the Leibnizian/reductionist tradition, and in particular with the no-
triviality requirement for PII already discussed in section 2. This is just to be expected, since 
we are now considering the „extreme‟ end of the spectrum of grades of individuality where 
individuals differ solo numero and, consequently, their individuality is not really reduced to 
anything. We thus conclude that the two forms of reductionism discussed so far (namely 
qualitative and solo numero difference) had better be kept apart. 
 
5. Non-relativistic quantum mechanics, weak discernibility and countability 
As promised, we now move on to discussing one specific case, the identity and non-
individuality of particles in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. In particular, we will look at 
the recent debate about the ontological status of quantum particles and argue that there are 
reasons for attributing primitive individuality to them, without betraying the spirit of a 
sensible form of naturalism about metaphysics. 
Surely, our everyday experience and classical mechanics support the idea that distinct 
objects must differ with respect to their spatial location. However, in the quantum domain 
things stand otherwise. In an influential paper we have already mentioned, French and 
Redhead (1988) started from the (controversial but widespread) identification of quantum 
properties with the quantities denoted by the probabilities appearing in the formalism, and 
considered two-particle systems of identical particles. They concluded that, both for fermions 
and for bosons, two particles of the same kind that partake in the same physical system have 
all the same properties, including (potential) spatial location.
11
 However, French and 
Redhead only took into account PIIa and PIIb in their paper. Indeed, it is now generally 
agreed that PIIb (and, consequently, PIIa) fails in quantum mechanics. What about PIIc? 
It would seem that the fact that quantum particles can share all their properties including 
potential spatial location (defined in terms of probabilities) makes PIIc fail too in this context. 
In a recent paper that we have already mentioned, however, Saunders argued that fermions in 
the singlet state of spin are weakly discernible, because they are in an irreflexive relation 
expressed by the symmetric but irreflexive predicate „… has opposite -spin component of 
spin to…‟ (2006; 59). Saunders‟ argument has been made more general and rigorous by 
Muller and Saunders (2008) and Muller and Seevinck (2009). The more general argument 
                                                 
10
 Remember our distinction above between two ways of understanding naturalism. 
11
 French and Redhead‟s results have been later improved upon by Butterfield (1993) and Huggett (2003).  
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(from now on, „MSS‟ argument‟) − which, quite importantly, doesn‟t employ probabilities to 
define the relevant properties − goes as follows: 
 
1)  Quantum particles are well-defined in number (COUNTABILITY);  
2)  Relations can be metaphysically genuine and yet fail to be reducible to monadic 
properties of their relata; 
3)  Physical discernibility must be grounded in physically meaningful properties; 
4)  By using COUNTABILITY, relations can be constructed out of physically meaningful 
single-particle operators (hence, satisfying 3)) that hold in many-particle systems of 
identical particles and satisfy the requirement for weak discernibility; 
5)  Since − in a way that should be deemed unproblematic in virtue of 2) − these relations 
are not reducible to monadic properties of their relata, weak discernibility is the 
maximum degree of discernibility that can be obtained in the relevant quantum systems;  
6)  However, weakly discerning relations can be reconstructed for all quantum systems. 
 
The conclusion of MSS‟ argument is thus that in quantum mechanics PIIc is always 
capable to discern, a fact that can be generalised to all particles and Hilbert spaces of all 
dimensions.
12
 This is very important for our discussion, as it seems to provide a reason for 
regarding PII, and therefore reductionism, as at least contingently true in our world: while 
macroscopic, classical objects appear to invariably obey PIIa or at least PIIb, it now seems 
that more basic constituents of reality never violate (at least) PIIc − roughly for the same 
reason for which Black‟s spheres do not violate it. This would clearly suffice for supporting 
what we have called the epistemic reading of PII in section 2. 
 Things are not so simple, however: MSS‟ argument raises a number of issues that are not 
easily sorted out and, we think, eventually lend support to the theses we are presenting in this 
paper. 
First, Muller and Seevinck themselves explain that their proof leads to treat two identical 
bosons in a factorisable, symmetric direct product state as discernible while, intuitively, such 
entities do not appear to be discernible. They then state that the discernibility of such bosons 
should be accepted in the same way in which one accepts other „quantum mysteries‟, such as 
the possibility of Schrödinger‟s cat (2009; Sec. 3, „Remark 4‟). But of course, one may take 
                                                 
12
 In particular, Muller and Saunders use only spin degrees of freedom (specifically, total spin relations) in finite 
Hilbert spaces; and more general commutator relations holding between distinct single-particle operators (e.g., 
position and momentum) in the case of infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. 
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the alternative route of modus tollens and use this consequence of their argument to question 
MSS‟ conclusion.  
Second, one may reject the relations constructed by MSS and accuse the latter of a form of 
“naïve realism about operators” (Daumer, Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì (1996)). Indeed, MSS 
do repeatedly point out that the relations they regard as weakly discerning are derived from 
operators whose physical meaningfulness is not questioned by anybody; but does this mean 
that the relations themselves are unexceptionable?   
Thirdly, and relatedly, one may protest, with Dieks and Veerstegh (2008) and Ladyman 
and Bigaj (2010), that weak discernibility at least betrays the Quine-Leibniz reductionist 
spirit, in that it doesn‟t correspond to the possibility of actually telling particles apart from 
each other through physical means and/or of establishing the genuineness of the relevant 
relations via „symmetry-breaking‟. Here too, the argument is certainly not conclusive, but 
definitely relevant for our present purposes. On the one hand, MSS need not be impressed by 
the sort of operationalist arguments presented by Dieks, Veerstegh, Ladyman and Bigaj. In 
general, reductionism need not be based on the possibility of actually discerning through 
physical means. On the other hand, one may take this objection to MSS‟ argument to foster 
the above, independently developed, doubts about the status of the alleged discerning 
relations. It is also worth pointing out that MSS draw a distinction between individuals 
(objects that are absolutely discernible on the basis of monadic and/or relational properties) 
and relationals (objects that are only weakly discernible) without saying anything explicit 
about the motivation for this differentiation. Even if, in all probability, this is just the result of 
a terminological choice based on logical considerations and established philosophical usage, 
such a differentiation might be intended as having ontological weight, i.e., as entailing that 
weak discernibility is considered by MSS to be insufficient for „full-blown individuality‟. 
Obviously enough, this represents another bit of support for the pluralistic view on 
individuality that we are developing in this paper. 
Of course, the foregoing is far from sufficient for a rejection of MSS‟ argument. However, 
that is not what we are looking for here. Rather, our point is that, once one puts the above 
considerations together with the infamous question, pointed at earlier, whether or not relations 
can „come first‟ with respect to their relata, the overall scenario is clearly the following: MSS 
develop a rigorous and clever, but also rather complicated and philosophically controversial, 
argument whose endorsement is mainly, if not exclusively, motivated by the presupposition of 
the correctness of Leibnizian reductionism, or at least by the supposed unavailability of a 
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different, non-reductive approach to individuality.
13
 But if these assumptions turned out not 
be obviously compelling for the naturalist, one would have a very good motivation for 
looking for a (naturalistically acceptable) alternative that doesn‟t require, in order to preserve 
the general Leibnizian framework, to (i) posit irreducible relations; (ii) be naïve or at least 
„very liberal‟ with respect to which properties are physically genuine; (iii) accept 
counterintuitive conclusions about certain physical systems; and, perhaps, even (iv) allow for 
entities which belong to a new, sui generis category.
14
 
It should be clear by now what, in view of this, our suggestion is going to be: a hitherto 
ignored (at least by naturalists) alternative – based on primitivism – is available and allows for 
a great methodological gain in terms of simplicity, clarity and conservativeness with respect 
to entrenched metaphysical beliefs and schemes, while being at least equally satisfactory in 
terms of defining an ontological interpretation that meets the criteria and constraints set by a 
naturalistic methodology. As a consequence of this, we conclude that primitivism should be 
preferred to Leibnizian reductionism at least in the non-relativistic quantum case.  
Crucially, the basis for this assertion is given by the physics itself. It consists of the simple 
and uncontroversial fact that premise 4) above is essentially based on premise 1), that is, on 
COUNTABILITY. If we are right in suggesting that primitivism is not necessarily in conflict 
with naturalism about metaphysics, it immediately follows from this that there is a much 
simpler alternative to the complicated scheme put forward by MSS, with all the issues it 
raises: namely, to regard COUNTABILITY not just as a merely formal fact about particle 
labels, but as metaphysically and physically significant in itself, without searching for 
additional principles in terms of which the countable entities could be regarded as discernible. 
In other words, one could maintain that the “presence” of n particles at the formal level has a 
direct ontological counterpart, so that it can be concluded that quantum particles are 
individuals independently of their qualities. After all, if the fact that a given physical system is 
composed of n particles in a purely formal sense is fundamental for even starting to show that 
the entities composing the system are discernible, it seems perfectly legitimate to regard 
quantum particles as („low-degree‟) individuals by moving from a purely formal to a non-
                                                 
13
 We do not attribute this presupposition to MSS themselves because they seem quite neutral on this. In fact, 
what they claim seems to be motivated by the mere presupposition that the question of whether physical objects 
can adequately be described by using PII is an interesting one. 
14
 Notice, in this connection, that a reductionist viewpoint seems to be shared also by authors who disagree with 
MSS. For instance, Dieks and Versteegh (2008) conclude their critique of MSS by arguing that one should opt 
for a holistic interpretation of quantum systems of identical particles (i.e., one where the total system simply has 
no component particles) (compare Hawley‟s (2009) „summing defence‟ of PII). This clearly suggests that Dieks 
and Versteegh too reject primitivism as unscientific. 
 19 
formal reading of countability, without caring about qualitative properties and 
(in)discernibility.
15
 
Summing up, the moral of our case study is as follows. Quantum particles can and should, 
we claim, be regarded as primitively individuated, simply because they are countable at the 
level of the formalism (a fact used in the extant proofs of their weak discernibility) and the 
extant ontological alternatives do not offer any advantage when an accurate critical 
comparison on the basis of methodological and pragmatic criteria is carried out. Opting for 
primitivism allows for a straightforward, uncomplicated ontological interpretation of the 
theory. We hope it is clear by now that accepting the view that countability can be read in an 
ontological sense directly from the formal language of the theory does not amount to 
prejudging the issue in our favour without giving arguments, nor is it “naïve realism about the 
formalism”. It simply amounts to preferring the simplest choice available for the 
interpretation of the relevant domain of material objects. In particular, in view of what we 
have been writing so far about the status of primitivism in a naturalistic context, this view 
should appear plausible and well-motivated to naturalists, especially in view of the price one 
has to pay to defend reductionism. Finally, notice that our form of primitivism is not 
incompatible with the view that quantum particles − under certain (non-negligible) 
assumptions − turn out to be weakly discernible: in our picture, it is perfectly possible to 
claim that primitively individuated objects also possess a derivative, less fundamental, grade 
of individuality − captured in this case by PIIc above. 
  
6. Should we be primitivists in general? 
We have argued that primitivism (when aptly formulated) does not imply a „jump‟ to a 
metaphysical viewpoint that is in principle unacceptable for the naturalist, and that it is in fact 
preferable in at least one important scientific domain. As a matter of fact, we suggested, a 
simple criterion − according to which one should always define one‟s ontology on the basis of 
the simplest and most direct interpretation (compatible with a naturalist methodology) of the 
language of the relevant theory − makes primitivism preferable in the case of non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics. An important question to be asked now is whether this doesn‟t make 
primitivism valid generally, i.e., for individuals at all levels. In particular, one might think that 
since quantum mechanics describes the most fundamental „building blocks‟ of reality, of 
which everything else is made of, then individuals at all less fundamental levels – i.e., the 
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 Interestingly, Ladyman and Bigaj express ideas similar to ours when they suggest that perhaps “anything that 
is the value of a first-order variable is an individual” (2010; 135), but do not emphasise the role played by 
countability assumptions in the arguments in favour of the weak discernibility of quantum particles.  
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individuals described by the other special sciences – will also automatically be individuated 
primitively: they will just be the individuals arising from the composition of (primitively 
individuated) particles x1, x2, …, xn.  
However, this only holds if one assumes a strong, or “avid” form of reductionism, i.e., a 
micro-reductionism á la Putnam-Oppenheim, according to which it is in principle possible to 
translate everything higher-level sciences say exclusively in the vocabulary of fundamental 
physics, in this case, non-relativistic quantum mechanics (of course, one also needs to assume 
that the latter theory has reached the “bottom” level of reality). As is well-known, though, this 
reductionist view is not very popular in contemporary philosophy of science – and, we 
believe, rightly so. If anything, what one can reasonably hope to achieve given the present 
status of the debate is (refined) Nagel-type reductions endowed with an explanatory, not an 
ontological, connotation.
16
 In other words, it seems fair to claim that theories describing 
different levels of reality might turn out to be in relevant mutual relationships, and there may 
even be a lot in the language of a higher-level theory that can be said without a significant 
loss of content in the language of a more fundamental theory. But by no means should this be 
interpreted as justifying any project of ontological reduction. 
Now, if this is the case, it follows that ontological questions such as that of individuality 
can and should be asked in a level- and context-dependent fashion, that is, always with 
specific and explicit reference to the entities belonging to the domain of inquiry of a specific 
science. This, we claim, gives us good reasons to be „naturalistic pluralists‟ about 
individuality, in the sense that the opposition between primitivism and reductionism can and 
should be overcome in favour of a more comprehensive and flexible view, allowing for 
different „grades of individuality‟ to be evaluated and assessed on the basis of their 
applicability and usefulness in the various specific theoretical contexts.  
At this point, given our emphasis on the language of the theory and on countability, one 
may consider it more or less obvious that objects are always countable at least at the formal 
level. This, however, is not so. The attribution of the various forms of individuality on the 
basis of our best available descriptions of reality requires, no doubt, a much more detailed 
treatment, and is a task for which further work is certainly needed. For the time being, it 
seems at any rate safe to claim, in a rather general fashion, that for the vast majority of 
macroscopic entities Leibniz‟ metaphysical views seem to apply at least contingently − think, 
in particular, of biological entities (apart from the possibility of clones) −, and PIIa 
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 For an interesting defence of a neo-Nagelian account of reduction, see for example Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg 
and Hartmann (2010). Another account of reduction, in terms of asymptotic behaviour, is spelled out by 
Batterman (2002). 
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consequently holds for them. Once classical mechanics (supplemented by an assumption of 
impenetrability which, incidentally, is not an integral part of the theory) is adopted, PIIb 
becomes a natural criterion of individuation: particles may have absolutely all the same 
monadic intrinsic properties, but they always differ with respect to position. In the quantum 
world, however, the landscape changes. As things stand, we have argued, primitive, non-
qualitative individuality appears preferable to PIIc in the non-relativistic case. Things, 
however, are likely to be different as one moves to quantum field theory, where we can have 
superpositions of particle number and, consequently, countability cannot be expected to play 
the same role as in the case of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. And yet different 
conclusions might be in order when it comes to even more fundamental physical theories such 
as quantum gravity, string theory etc. The sort of pluralism that we have recommended takes 
all this into account, and makes room for different ontological perspectives to be applied at 
different levels and in different domains.  
Having mentioned that in quantum field theory the lack of countability may suffice for not 
endorsing an ontology of individual objects, we are now in a position to add one further 
clarification. Of course, also in non-relativistic quantum mechanics one could uphold that 
particles really are modes of excitation of the underlying quantum field: after all, that might 
just be the right ontology for the domain in question. This is fine, but doesn‟t contradict our 
earlier claims here. For, it is important to see how exactly the alternative ontology is arrived 
at: several authors (e.g., Saunders (2006)) argued in favour of it on the basis that bosons are 
not discernible in any way in the non-relativistic context; this, however, is a move that is put 
into doubt by the results about weak discernibility (obtained among others by Saunders 
himself) that we discussed earlier. And if the conclusion that the right ontology is one of 
“modes of field excitations” is obtained via considerations that do not have to do with non-
relativistic quantum mechanics, our point about this latter theory and what its formalism 
suggests remains intact (at least given our pluralist viewpoint).
17
 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have argued against entrenched prejudices against primitivism about 
individuality, and in particular against the idea that a naturalistic approach to metaphysics 
inevitably leads to a Leibnizian-Quinean stance with respect to identity and individuality. 
Moreover, we have critically assessed a contextualist view that, in fact, amounts to a form of 
non-Leibnizian reductionism. In a case study dealing with non-relativistic quantum 
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 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point. 
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mechanics, we applied these general premises to make explicit certain assumptions that are 
customarily made in a tacit form in the literature and prove them unjustified. On this basis, we 
defended primitivism about the individuality of quantum particles. At a more general level, 
however, we recommended a more flexible sort of pluralism about identity and individuality, 
one that we regard as more in harmony with the actual relationship between the different 
sciences and their different domains of inquiry, and also between different theories and 
models in the same domain.  
The proposed perspective enables one, among other things, to shed light on existing 
oppositions and conflicting views about the nature of individuals and the conditions of 
individuation of things. For instance, many authors, including historical figures such as, for 
example, Schrödinger, thought that quantum particles were not individuals. But this was, it 
seems, because they held the view of individuality captured by PIIa and PIIb as generally 
and absolutely valid. A similar presupposition, it seems, also underlies the current discussion 
about the ontology of quantum mechanics, which we looked at in some detail. However, if, as 
we have suggested, individuality is not a monolithic concept, then „how much individuality‟ 
an object has can be meaningfully asked, and (objective and well-defined! We don‟t think 
there is any room for conventionalism or relativism here) answers can and should be sought 
by having recourse to our best knowledge of the relevant field. This, however, without 
expecting, as it happened so far, one form of individuality and one correct criterion of 
individuation (either primitivism or reductionism) to be valid across all fields of knowledge. 
The most important work to be done in the future is thus, as mentioned above, to test the 
whole set of available forms of individuality against the background of specific scientific 
theories. We think that – especially once Leibnizian or at any rate reductionist prejudices are 
set aside − this can be expected to produce a vast array of novel philosophical results.  
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